

00:26.09 Thank you very much. What I'd like to do now is to offer Jay the opportunity to respond to the respondents and then we can take it from there.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:26.28 My responses will be very brief. I would agree that the potential for dialogue between Levinas and Buddhist sources is huge. I've always found Levinas very inspiring and Levinas's moral insights, I think, are ones that deserve to be brought into more contrib- more dialogue with Buddhism than they have been in the past and so I thank you for that.

00:26.59 Gareth, you're right to be bringing out all of the richness of the Buddhist ethical tradition that I managed to omit. And of course, there's a great deal more to be said and your work in tantric ethics says a great deal of it, as well. It's probably unreasonable for any of us here to think that in this panel we're going to explore all that is valuable or important in Buddhist ethics and so, it's good that there's a number of

people up here talking as well as a number of important experts in the audience who will very soon, I expect, supplement what we've said here.

00:27.39

And one remark to Bob Pollack, whose talk I found extremely rich and utterly consonant in spirit with much of what I see in Mahayana ethics. You're right that I certainly didn't attend to mortality as much as one might have and as much as one would have had I been spending a good deal more time developing a Buddhist analysis of suffering. The only thing I can say in defense of the tradition is there is no dearth of talk about death in Buddhist ethics or Buddhist morals. Only in my talk, for which I apologize.

00:28.21

But, fortunately, you supplemented that and filled that necessary void. I do think that you've succeeded in pointing out one of the interesting differences and a deep and fascinating one that probably deserves a lot more thought than we'll have time to give it today

between Semitic and Buddhist ways of taking up with ethics and the problem. That is, I've characterized a Buddhist approach to thinking about moral theory as one that sort of takes the fact of suffering as the primary problem.

00:29.01

And you've correctly adverted to the way that the Semitic traditions tend to take up the problem, fundamental problem of ethics as seeing purpose in the face of purposelessness as the fundamental moral problem. And those are really different ways of seeing the moral landscape and they're both very deep ways of seeing the moral landscape.

00:29.23

And, probably had I thought more deeply, more carefully and with more intelligence than I have, I would have thought of framing it that way. But I didn't - I'm not that smart. And, so I thank you for seeing that way of framing the contrast, which I think might be a very fruitful way of

thinking about how Semitic and Buddhist ethical theory can come into dialogue.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:29.50 Maybe we'll just have another conference.

**JAY GARFIELD**

Alright. That's a good plan, yep. But, I think we should give a chance for people in the audience to have a say.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:30.02 I have a number of questions on cards here and the first question I'd like to begin with is very simple and straightforward in its formulation, but I think it's actually a very important question and one that's particularly important to come out from the different angles of the different traditions and ways of thinking that are represented on the panel.

00:30.26 And the question is - what is the distinction between ethics and morality. And maybe it would be good to begin with Jay's thoughts on that from

the perspective of the target paper and then we can move on.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:30.44

The word ethics has a Greek root, *ethicos*. The word morality has a Latin root, *morales*. And they translate each other, so one difference is one is Greek in origin and one is Roman in origin. Many people would use these entirely interchangeably. Sometimes ethics gets used in a special way when it can join with things like professional ethics, medical ethics, business ethics.

00:31.09

Nobody ever talks about business morality. Or medical morality. But anyway, I think that that's a very specialized use and I guess I've heard people try to create a distinction between the semantic ranges of these words where one of them is supposed to have to do with high theory and one's supposed to have to do with particular-

00:31.31 But I've heard different people draw that distinction in different ways and I guess I've lost track of it completely.

**EDITH WYSCHOGROD**

00:31.38 Yeah, Levinas does address this question. Ethics, for him, is the primordial relation to the other. Ethics is capital E. Now, the moral life in his thought refers to a level that he calls justice. That is, with the advent of the- of another person, the other - the other with a capital O - is a dyadic relation and that's what founds capital E, Ethics.

00:32.13 But, he understands very well that there are not just two and as soon as a third emerges you have a need for small m, the moral life, which he generally designates as justice. Now, it's that level at which I would argue Kantian ethics comes into play.

00:32.36 Namely, the notion of the universal and the juridical dimension in life without which you can't have a just society. End of story.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:32.47 Can I contribute?

**EVAN THOMPSON**

Go ahead.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:32.51 Jay's kind remarks to me, actually I think, provide a slightly different answer than the fact that one is Greek and one is Latin. I think absent any eschatology, they collapse to the same meaning, but in an eschatological context where there is another world and your place in it will be determined by your actions in this one, then the gleanings from revelation drive a moral position and the choices you make in the absence of eschatology are the ethical ones.

00:33.20 That's why professional eth- professional choices append to ethics and not morality and religious choices append to morality and not ethics. If you

collapse eschatology, they collapse to the same meaning.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:33.35 There's a question up here in the front.

**ROBERT VAN GULICK**

00:33.39 One brief comment about the Semitic, Indo-European contrast. I mean, I think part of it may be coming from the fact that one has a historical dimension. The Semitic, there usually is a whole notion that there's a history and one of the things you've been emphasizing in the Buddhist tradition is the cyclical nature. Obviously, if you're thinking of this as having history - what Hegel called the problem of history - then obviously, you've gotta know what the purpose of this is.

00:34.01 It always has a direction. So, I think that's a very deep, basic cultural divide. I wanted to ask Jay, particularly, how he could relate what he had to say to what we heard also in- from other people, like Mark Siderits, about the absence of

the self because I approach this as an outsider and I want to understand how the kind of compassion and the social dimension connects together with the notion that the self is illusory and that craving and aversion are versions of ignorance.

00:34.30

And so, how do you sort of strike the balance between the fact that suffering seems to be real with the notion that the self is unreal?

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:34.39

Yeah. That's a very good question. And gosh. No, no, no, no - just trying to figure out whether it's the very short version, the very long version or the middle. We'll take the middle path version here. What - I should do the very long one? Ok.

00:35.00

The- Here's one way to put it. One of the fundamental ideas in a Buddhist account of suffering is the origin of suffering in a very particular kind of ignorance. Now- or confusion,

as I prefer to translate it. I like confusion better. Because when you get a gloss on this form of confusion, it's not just an absence of knowledge, but rather the superimposition of a false picture on something to which that picture doesn't apply.

00:35.36

So, it's actually more like error than it is simply the negation of knowledge. And the superimposition and question that is the most fundamental one that lies at the root of suffering is the superimposition of the fundamental reality and importance of a self and that which pertains to the self or belongs to the self as having some kind of a fundamental reality in nature.

00:36.04

Now, Buddhist metaphysics is grounded, as well, in this notion that we haven't talked about much - though Mark mentioned it, but only in passing - this notion of two truths. A conventional truth and an ultimate truth. Now, different Buddhist

schools parse out the difference between and the relation between these two truths very differently.

00:36.26

But, for now, one way of thinking about the kind of confusion to which I just diverted is this - it can take the form of seeing something which is merely conventionally true, which is merely nominally true, as having an ultimate reality or an ultimate truth. Now, the moment I do that with respect to myself- So a person is something that's got a kind of conventional reality and here, the easiest kind of model for those of us who were kind of raised in this part of the world is to think of Hume for a minute.

00:37.04

And to think of Hume on a good, sophisticated reading of the treatise, where we want to say that it is- in a perfectly good factionalist sense, persons are conventionally real. We have a whole set of conventions, passions, acts of the imagination that constitute a conventionally real

self, but that doesn't mean that on analysis we find something that exists substantially as a self, as the theater in which the ideas occur.

00:37.33

Alright, our reality is reality like the church. Now, the misapprehension that takes self and other to exist substantially and to be substantially different that is what then on this analysis allows me to draw a distinction, say, between prudential and moral concerns. Concerns that are rational for me to have versus concerns that are optional. And allows me to act in ways that appear to be conducive to my own well-being. And antithetical to the well-being of others.

00:38.12

But which in the end produce suffering not only for others and to me because of interdependence and so forth. As there are two ways to suffer: you can suffer from somebody else doing something to you, you can suffer from being an asshole, right. And they're both ways of suffering. It

sounds glib, but it's- there's a deep insight there.

00:38.29

Now, suffering doesn't have to attach to alternately real persons because when we look at what the bases of imputation are for persons, those bases are continua of causally connected psychophysical processes. And suffering, like any other mental state or mental episode, is a momentary phenomenon. Though it can be a very frequent momentary phenomenon in one of these continua.

00:38.57

So, you don't need to get persons in order to get suffering going, but one good way to get suffering going is to take- that is you don't have to have ultimately existent persons to get suffering going, you maybe have to get persons just to have that psychophysical continua. But one really good way to get suffering going in psychophysical continua is to act in a way that's

grounded in taking those psychophysical continua to be a hell of a lot realer than they are.

00:39.24

And so taking the interests of a particular one of those to be a hell of a lot more important than it is. So, a kind of Humean or quasi-Humean metaphysics of personhood is consistent both with seeing suffering as a real phenomenon – indeed an omnipresent phenomenon – and as one that doesn't necessarily attach to ultimately existent persons, but one that's bound up with a particular way of mistaking these continua for something that they're not.

00:39.53

Now, as a kind of longish footnote to this – which I won't utter, but will simply mention – I could write a longish footnote that would point out that when we look at Hume's account of the relationship between the moral passions and the conventions with regard to the self, we could now proceed to develop even deeper parallels.

00:40.14                   And if then we continued and looked at Schopenhauer's "On the Basis of Morality," we would see an even deeper parallel in the Western tradition. Does that help at all?

**ROBERT VAN GULICK**

00:40.26                   Yeah. To put it very bluntly, I'm very (unintell) how a Buddhist from an ethical perspective decides between choosing- between trying to help somebody overcome their ignorance and overcome their cravings and their aversions, as opposed to actually helping them. I mean, when they're sick or when they're hungry or such. I mean, obviously, you want them to do both and I'm trying to understand the interplay between those two. That's- so-

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:40.50                   Oh, that's a much harder question, of course. So- and that requires- that's a detailed question about what the best thing is for this person to do at this particular time. Here's one way to look at it. Suppose that I thought that you suffered from a conceptual confusion about a

particular Buddhist text and from gall bladder stones.

00:41.12

I'd want a surgeon to come in to take care of the latter problem, but I might be happy working on the former problem, though we probably wouldn't do them at the same time, right. And it might sort of depend on how we could schedule the surgery and the seminar which one came first and which one came second. That's not real deep, but-

**EDITH WYSCHOGROD**

00:41.30

I'd like to address that question. I think we have not distinguished between what counts as alleviation. Let me give two examples. Take the Catholic Worker Movement. You directly feed the poor. You live with them. I need not go into detail about the charitable works within groups of that kind. That's the immediate alleviation of suffering.

00:42.00

Now, the second modality, which is the one that raises questions is more or less in the mode that

Bob raised in talking about Bonhoeffer. And I think of my own very good friends, the survivors of the White Rose Movement - the sister of Sophie Scholl and so on. And they were political protestors. Do they count as alleviators of suffering insofar as they anticipated suffering as a result of the actions of others who were implicated in a politics likely to cause suffering?

00:42.41

Now, where are the lines of alleviation to be drawn? I'm raising the question. I'm not offering an answer.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:42.51

I think we have Alan who wants to say something and then Stephen over here who wants to say something.

**ALAN WALLACE**

00:42.57

I'd like to make a response to a comment you made, Jane- Jay. And that is when you equated Buddhism with engaged Buddhism and said at one point - I paraphrase - there is no place in

Buddhist practice for retreating from the world. You can imagine, probably I don't need to say anything at all, but I'll say something anyway. I think that Western civilization has been impoverished by the fact that with the rise of science, with the rise of the Protestant movement we lost so much of our Christian and Jewish contemplative heritage.

00:43.27

I think that's a tragedy for us, frankly. And it wasn't necessary, but that's what happened. So, the Protestant ethic kind of took over – you're not doing anything good unless you're doing something out there in the world. I think of a statement by the Dalai Lama. He was asked once, His Holiness, do you ever feel lonely. And the response that I've heard was, no, I never feel lonely. I always feel engaged with others.

00:43.50

And so, I think there's a profound role in the Buddhist practice for temporarily withdrawing from active engagement in society, but one may do

that in the most altruistic and compassionate way, as the Dalai Lama suggests, even when you're in solitude. Even if that lasts for 20 years. And I've known yogis, Tibetan contemplatives who spent 20, 30 years in solitude. When they withdraw, it's not simply an escapism. It's not for selfish purposes. It's not I've had it with the world.

00:44.14

But a temporary withdrawal in order to bring about profound transformation in order to reengage much more effectively. So, I think when we look at the history of Buddhism, really in multiple traditions - Theravada, Zen and so forth - very frequently, if not invariably, those who have had the greatest impact and are most beloved centuries after their passing away are those who have temporarily withdrawn for altruist motivations and then returned and made an extraordinary contribution to the world that might otherwise had been impossible.

00:44.44 Final comment, Pascal. His statement I can only paraphrase, but the trouble with modern man is our inability to sit quietly in our chambers - I think is very, very germane to this.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:44.54 I have absolutely no quarrel with that. I'll reread what I said, that was that Buddhist practice is never a retreat from, but always a committed engagement with the world. I consider altruistic retreat practice to be a form of committed engagement. Just as, you know, if you imagine that the young person who goes to a particular place sees a horrible disease afflicting a population - what's the right thing to do, to sit there with absolutely no skills and commiserate or to go to medical school and do something about it, right?

00:45.26 You often have to retreat in order to engage. What I was warning against was a popular view of Buddhism as something that involves a solitary kind of quest that lacks any serious engagement

with the world. So, if I were- if I was taken to disparage the contemplative life, I apologize for having given rise to that misapprehension.

**ALAN WALLACE**

00:45.52

I'm sure that's not the case.

**JAY GARFIELD**

Many of my best friends and teachers have been long-term contemplatives.

**ALAN WALLACE**

00:45.55

I'm sure that's not the case. I just wanted to be explicit and now it is. Thank you.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:45.58

Can I- Could I ask you both- Can I ask both of you, then, whether there is any different ethical burden in Buddhist terms to confronting the kind of what I think in the West is called the natural evil of say, the sick kids who need a doctor and so, one goes to medical school and the human evil of willful cruelty, which does not require one to learn about nature, but rather to see an unnatural act emerging on the bad side of things

as the unnatural act to act with loving kindness is unnatural.

00:46.42

How is the contemplative choice justifiable in the face of the bad behavior of other people as opposed to the problems of nature?

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:46.53

Do you want that one Alan or do you want me to take that one? I think that one of the crucial conceptual constructs in Buddhist theory is the construct of upaya or topka (ph), skill and means. Different people are endowed with different skills. There's a reason that I'm not a doctor. I was terrible at organic chemistry.

00:47.16

And that's just not a way in which I would ever be able to make a contribution. I know lots of people who can't do philosophy, some people who can't meditate well, people who aren't good engineers. And then, fortunately, there are people who are good at each of these kind of things. One of the things that I think it's

important for anybody to do is to figure out where you can make a contribution.

00:47.40

Not all of us are going to make contributions in all domains. Some of us are fortunate enough to be able to make contributions in many, but boy, those people are few and we admire them for it. But I think that that's just always a hard personal choice and a hard kind of question about self-knowledge to know what you can do successfully and where you'd better step aside and let somebody who's actually got the skills do the job.

00:48.05

I don't perform surgery.

**ALAN WALLACE**

00:48.08

Could I add a footnote to that?

**JAY GARFIELD**

Yeah.

**ALAN WALLACE**

00:48.10

And that is we have in Christianity, be perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect. And he's

not, I think, addressing particular people with special skill sets or talents, but an overall orientation for all humanity is to strive for perfection, whatever your particular skills or talents may be. And I think we have something similar to that in Buddhism, most explicitly in Mahayana Buddhism of the Bodhisattva ideal.

00:48.30

Whether you have a natural proclivity for music, for engineering, for gardening or child rearing, the overall- the desire of desires - going back to Augustine, of the spiritual life being really a prioritization of desires - the desire above all desires is to achieve spiritual perfection, spiritual awakening in order to be of greater service to all beings.

00:48.49

And I think that is kind of the overall gestalt for all Buddhist practice. Within that, on an upaya level, some people are gonna be better at engineering and other people are better at teaching or meditating and so on.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:49.01 I think Stephen had a question.

**STEPHEN PHILLIPS**

00:49.03 Yes, I'd like for Jay, in particular, or any of you to continue to dwell on this topic. In the yogic literature- In the yogic literature and I take it also in Buddhism, there's a real tension between Sanyasa and social ethics. So much so that when a person takes Sanyasa, the family will weep, consider the person lost to the world and so on.

00:49.36 And two ways that I've heard the tension resolved in favor of Sanyasa is, one is, you all have been saying that you cannot really help another until you have improved yourself. And so, this would be motivation for recognizing a duty of self-development. And this makes some sense, though it shouldn't be- I don't know- glibly waved as an excuse for social irresponsibility, as I take it is really the whole point of your remarks.

00:50.17 But, a second justification is then that the particular santana of which my or your present moments of consciousness, feeling, et cetera are involved in have a- have greater causal power for the, what I would call, future moments of myself and - in the conventional sense - and you- future moments of yourself. And so, we have a special responsibility when it comes even to alleviation of suffering-

00:51.02 -to secure our own reduction of suffering before those of others.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:51.20 Question I'm tempted just to hand this one back to Alan, too.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

Good idea.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:51.24 Good idea? Yeah. And maybe I will invite Alan to comment on this, as well. But, look at- there's always in any tradition that recognizes multiple levels of social engagement and multiple levels

of moral engagement, going to be tensions between decisions to act on one level versus another. As Alan correctly said, the kind of ruling moral motivation - in especially the Mahayana tradition, but I think really in Buddhism quite generally - is Bodhichitta, the altruistic aspiration to attain awakening for the sake of all sentient beings.

00:52.04

But often, the local route to that global goal involves much more local action than renunciation of all worldly practices for pure spiritual- for pure spiritual practice. Another way of looking at that is many people within the Buddhist tradition see engaged Bodhisattva action as involving the purification of very mundane altruistic action as Bodhisattva action, as a vehicle for the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of wisdom towards the attainment of awakening for the sake of sentient beings.

00:52.44

So, this is one way of resolving that tension - to say that, you know, Sanyasa in this framework can be very much a kind of locus, samvrti (ph) kind of- set of actions. That's ok, too. And that's- and all of this is to say that there are multiple strategies for thinking about this tension within the tradition. One is to say, look, maybe the best thing to do is long-term retreat before one acts. Another thing to do is to say to forego one's own long-term retreat because one sees more skillful and more useful things to do in the world immediately.

00:53.21

Another is to actually retreat by engaging in worldly beneficial action. And the tradition has certainly got examples of each of these - canonically and probably in our very own lifetime. So, you're right that there's a tension, but I don't see deep resolution problems and I see multiple paths to resolving that tension in thinking about one's own moral life. Alan, did you want to say more about that?

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:53.56 Anne has a question, comment.

**ANNE KLEIN**

00:54.00 Just in the spirit of sometimes voicing what the tradition itself has to say, I just mention that from some perspectives, certainly within the Tibetan tradition, there is not necessarily this discrepancy between retreating and helping the world, but the prayers and practices themselves at the very time that they are practiced are considered to be a benefit.

00:54.24 And that may seem quite esoteric from many points of view, but perhaps it is something that someday in the 30,000 years from now, science would like to investigate.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:54.36 Georges. Wait until you get the mike, though.

**GEORGES DREYFUS**

00:54.40 I think there is a real danger of simplifying things because I think there is a real tension between responsibility to oneself and the

responsibility to others. And you find a lot of articulation of that tension in the Vinaya, which prescribes a number of duties that monks have towards others.

00:55.00

So I think it would be greatly simplified- in a way, in the minor perspective, you're right - there is a solution and it's full Buddhahood. Because Buddha is described as having achieved perfection for oneself as well as perfection for others. So, in the minor perspective, you would say that tension remains until you're a Buddha, which is obviously a solution. But it's not underestimating the degree to which there is a tension in the tradition.

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:55.29

I agree completely. I want to acknowledge that there's tension, and also strategies for addressing and resolving the tension and multiple ways of understanding each, yeah.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

00:55.38

Jinpa.

**THUBTEN JINPA**

00:55.40

This is a question for both Jay and Professor Pollack, as well. One thing that has always puzzled me is, you know, discussions of ethics often sort of, you know, turn towards, you know- we pay kind of- we pay acknowledgement to the fact that ethics is a social phenomenon, you know, ethical action is a social act and it's in the context of society and others.

00:56.09

And particularly Levinas brings out the centrality of the recognition of others in one's understanding of ethics. But then when the discussion proceeds, it always turns on some kind of individual's intention, action and consequences and so on. And then also, if you look at individuals, you know, I mean apart- maybe there are a few exceptions, but everyone would like to believe that they are good.

00:56.38

They would like to act in a beneficial way. Everyone would probably agree that compassion is

important. But somehow this value never gets fully translated on the societal level. So, I'm just wondering whether any of you on the panel have given thought on how this could be done.

00:56.59

I mean, you know, particularly with reference to Martin Luther's quote that you cited. It's very powerful, but how can we- you know, what is missing in this step from individual to the society, you know. What kind of mechanism should there be that would translate from this good intentions on the level of individual to society?

**EDITH WYSCHOGROD**

00:57.23

Oh, I'm sorry. Please go ahead. Well, in- again, I don't want to keep appealing to the philosophy of Levinas because my own position is not always a Levinasian one, but Levinas speaks of proximity. That's his term. There are two modes of engagement with the other.

00:57.46

One is that of the teacher, which is pedagogical. The teacher is magisterial and sees the other as

on high. The other is proximity - the neighbor, the one who is close to me. The analogy there I would say is to tactility. You almost touch the other.

00:58.10

There is a transformation through the impact of the other. Let me use an analogy that Levinas might not like very much, but in the history of epistemology there is a view of sensation and one place where you can find it, where it's really fun to see is in the play called, "Molly Sweeney" - not "Sweeney Todd," "Molly Sweeney" - where a blind woman gains her sight.

00:58.44

And the question is does she when she ceases to use touch, transfer her identification of objects - a solid sphere or a solid box - to the visual. Now that's a puzzle that was undertaken by John Locke, who in turn got it from a French philosopher Molyneux. It was Molyneux's puzzle.

00:59.10 In any case, the answer is no. A pedagogy is required, pedagogy which will show her the difference between a box and a sphere. And I think that is, in a sense, what Buddhism provides that is absent in, as much as I admire the Levinasian notion about territory, there is not a pedagogy attached to the impact of the other and that is, I think, something I would like to see happen.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:59.48 Jinpa. I think the path to an answer comes in disagreeing with the premise. You would say everyone would agree that everyone wishes to behave well, but I would say no. I would say the suffering we see as a data point is the consequence of - to use Jay's technical term - a large number of assholes in the world.

01:00.08 People who choose not to alleviate suffering, people who choose either out of selfishness or stupidity or whatever the reason, not a path that alleviates suffering. And so then, the burden on

those who wish to choose that is not that they have to find the way to be the first one in agreement, but rather they have to find the strength to disagree with what is the large cultural premise that is there's something wrong with you if you act this way.

01:00.35

And I think that would be my first answer. That one must have the courage of one's convictions - a problem raised by the absence of genuine consensus on what is right. Second, and this will come from that portion of the five books of Moses which I happen to be in the position of having read just yesterday. On the second time that God tries to get the Israelites to accept the commandments at Sinai - the first having led to the Golden Calf disaster -

01:01.07

the people now somewhat cowed by that failure are given a second chance and they say as a people, we will do and we will hear. And there's a paradox in there. The first time and all other

times we will hear and we will do is what one does when one takes instruction. But here, what is said is we will do and by doing, we will gain the capacity to hear.

01:01.29

That is what Bruce calls I would- for some reason obscure to me a Protestant notion. It seems to me a deeply Western notion that you act and you learn by acting, rather than contemplating first and then choosing to act. So, then I give you complimentary answers. The first is the choice to be has to be a minority choice in this world.

01:01.49

And second, the choice to be has to be followed by a choice to act because that's my tradition.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

01:01.57

We've reached our time. I would like to give Jay the opportunity for a last word, as our target-targetist, if you'd like to take that.

**JAY GARFIELD**

01:02.09

The only thing I'll do is add one more piece to the answer to Thubten Jinpa-la. Two more pieces.

One, you know a lot more nice people than I do  
and I would agree that-

**ROBERT POLLACK**

01:02.19 That's another answer.

**JAY GARFIELD**

01:02.21 But the third thing that I would add- I would  
agree with everything that Robert just said, but  
the third thing that I would add is humans'  
capacity-

01:02.28 \*\*\*TAPE END\*\*\*

MIND & REALITY

DAY TWO – TAPE 7 of 7 – PANEL ON ETHICS, CLOSING PANEL

\*\*\*TAPE START\*\*\*

**JAY GARFIELD**

00:00.05

-so even those who honestly do want to do good are unbelievably capable of self-deception and so, actually not acting on that motivation, but on another or just on making really dumb mistakes. I've never- I mean I- you wouldn't believe how stupid people are.

**ROBERT POLLACK**

00:00.29

And on that note.

**EVAN THOMPSON**

And on that very cheerful note. Let me just say there's been a slight change in schedule. What we're going to do is not take a break. We're going to invite Paul Gailey and the closing panelists up onto the stage to make some closing remarks and then probably end-

00:00.48

\*\*\*TAPE BREAK\*\*\*